Last Updated: 2012-02-08 03:25:57 UTC
by Jim Clausing (Version: 1)
There was a post on Ars Technica yesterday, that led back to another blog post from Sunday that suggests that Google Chrome will stop doing CRL checks at some point in the not too distant future. This has led to some interesting debate because the CRL mechanism has largely been ineffective. For a public key infrastructure (PKI) such as HTTPS to work, there must be an effective way of verifying the validity of the certificates. Due to the number of Certificate Authority (CA) breaches in recent years we'd all like a fast and effective method of taking compromised certificates out of play. During the highest profile breaches, all the major browser vendors simply pushed new versions of the browser with the root certificates from the breached CAs removed, in part because the browsers by design fail open (allow the connection) if they are unable to verify the certificate. So, is this a big deal? Is it the right way to go? Is it time to rethink/redesign/replace SSL or HTTPS? What do you think?
Jim Clausing, GIAC GSE #26
jclausing --at-- isc [dot] sans (dot) edu