Web server logs containing RS=^ ?
A SANS ISC reader sent us the following Apache log snippet earlier today
108.178.x.x - [11/Mar/2014:04:21:14 +0100] "GET /index.shtml/RK=0/RS=o_wLEbyzxJDMeXhdrhZU9KN7uD4- HTTP/1.0" 302 206
196.196.x.x - [11/Mar/2014:07:43:19 +0100] "GET /index.shtml/RS=^ADAY1N1JxWPFnnOEW3FpVC1g.n4rec- HTTP/1.0" 302 206
88.80.x.x - [11/Mar/2014:15:02:01 +0100] "GET /index.shtml/RS=^ADAw5eOsxy0br6iGm1BZPRs2wtnyAE- HTTP/1.1" 302 206
index.shtml exists on the reader's server, but the RS= / RK= stuff is bogus. The RS= looks like it could be a regular expression for a pattern match of sorts, since it is starting with an anchor "^", but that's guessing. We don't really know. Googling for the pattern shows that this sort of thing has been around for a while, but I didn't find any definite explanation about which software or toolkit these requests are attempting to exploit, if any. If you have information on what this is, please share in the comments below, or via our contact form.
Identification and authentication are hard ... finding out intention is even harder
While the drama about the lost airplane in Malaysia is still continuing, our hearts of course go out to the families of the missing. This ISC diary though is not about airplanes, or terrorism, it is rather about the related discovery that at least two passengers on the plane were using fake passports. Equally startling was the comment by Interpol that this is "common". What is the point of maintaining, for example, a no-fly list, if those listed on it anyway travel with stolen documents, and if the security checkpoint apparently fails to determine that a 19yr old doesn't look like a 40yr old, and that Italians who don't speak at least rudimentary Italian are, well, somewhat rare?
If we translate this to the virtual world, it turns into an everyday problem. How do we know that Joe using Joe's password is actually Joe, and not Jane? I probably should call them "Bob" and "Alice" to make this worthy of a scientific paper :), but the problem still stands: identification and authentication are hard, and finding out intentions is even harder. If we take from the airport physical security playbook, then it is "behavior" that makes the difference. The security checkpoint guys are (supposedly) trained to look for "clues" like nervousness, and carry-on baggage that is leaking 1,2,3-trinitroxypropane. Inevitably, there are numerous software products that claim to identify the "unusual" as well. Joe connecting from Connecticut, even though he lives in Idaho? Alert! Joe using Chrome even though he used Firefox last time? Alert! Joe typing his password faster than usual? Alert!
But like in the physical world, this kind of profiling only works well if you have a pretty homogenous and static "good guy" population, and a pretty well defined adversary. The real world, unfortunately, tends to be more diverse and complex than that. Which is why login fraud detection, just as airport security, often drowns in the "false positives", and as a result, de-tunes the sensitivity to the point where real fraud has stellar odds to just slip by. This is a fundamental issue with many security measures. Statisticians call this "base rate fallacy". If there are many many! more good guys than bad guys, finding the bad guys with a test that has a high error rate is pretty much: moot.
Checking the passports against the Interpol list of stolen passports .. wouldn't hurt though. Not doing this is akin to letting someone log in to an account that is suspended, or log in with a password that was valid two years ago.
Comments
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Dec 3rd 2022
10 months ago
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Dec 3rd 2022
10 months ago
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Anonymous
Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
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Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
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Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
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Dec 26th 2022
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Dec 26th 2022
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Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
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Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
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Jan 2nd 2023
9 months ago