Is a telco in Brazil hosting an epidemic of open SOCKS proxies?
This is a guest diary submitted by Alan Tu. Please let us know if you like this kind of post.
I became interested in how criminals and bad actors conceal the origin point of their Internet traffic. TOR, The Onion Router project, is one common way to anonymize Internet traffic. TOR nodes allow any proxy-aware application to send traffic through the encrypted anonymity tunnel [1].
But there are other ways to route traffic other than TOR. It turns out there are lists of open proxies being posted. A person interested in anonymity, whether for good or not, can use a working and open proxy to hide the true source of Internet activity.
A tale of three sites
socks24.org ("Socks Around The Clock"), live-socks.net ("Daily Fresh Live Socks"), and vipsocks24.net ("Daily Hand-Picked Premium Servers") are three websites that appear to post a daily list of alleged open SOCKS proxies. The lists posted on September 28, 2017 are here: [2, 3, 4].
5,762 unique IP and port pairs were collected from these three lists. 5,109, or 89%, of the alleged open proxies are common to all three lists. I performed a reverse DNS lookup on all IP addresses, then sorted the results by top level domain name. Here are the top 15 domains:
|
Domain |
Count |
|
Virtua.com.br |
5109 |
|
Comporium.net |
42 |
|
Hinet.net |
22 |
|
Cnt-grms.ec |
16 |
|
Comcast.net |
16 |
|
Optonline.net |
14 |
|
Teletalk.net.br |
12 |
|
Ip-37-59-0.eu |
11 |
|
Amazonws.com |
8 |
|
rr.com |
8 |
|
Secureserver.net |
8 |
|
Scaleway.com |
8 |
|
Bahnhof.se |
6 |
|
Puntonet.ec |
5 |
|
Cox.net |
5 |
What's going on in Brazil?
I sorted the IP addresses that resolved to virtua.com.br. The IP addresses are in 47 subnets, and according to LACNIC [5], belong to Autonomous System AS28573 assigned to Claro S.A. Claro Brazil is a large telecommunications provider.
Table:
Subnet, IP Addresses
177.32.0.0/14, 173
177.64.0.0/15, 1
177.80.0.0/14, 107
177.140.0.0/14, 632
177.180.0.0/14, 71
177.192.0.0/14, 54
177.0.0/16, 11
179.105.0.0/16, 18
179.152.0.0/14, 76
179.156.0.0/14, 163
179.208.0.0/14, 301
179.212.0.0/14, 10
179.216.0.0/14, 1,052
179.220.0.0/14, 13
179.232.0.0/14, 62
181.213.0.0/16, 1
181.216.0.0/13, 19
186.204.0.0/14, 230
186.220.0.0/14, 159
187.2.0.0/15, 12
187.20.0.0/14, 46
187.36.0.0/14, 151
187.64.0.0/14, 100
187.104.0.0/14, 56
187.122.0.0/15, 10
187.180.0.0/14, 27
187.255.0.0/16, 2
189.4.0.0/14, 92
189.29.0.0/16, 7
189.32.0.0/14, 141
189.54.0.0/15, 5
189.60.0.0/14, 173
189.100.0.0/14, 190
189.120.0.0/14, 489
191.176.0.0/14, 12
191.180.0.0/14, 97
191.184.0.0/14, 35
191.188.0.0/14, 28
200.160.96.0/20, 2
201.6.0.0/16, 12
201.17.0.0/16, 8
201.21.0.0/16, 3
201.37.0.0/16, 35
201.52.0.0/15, 148
201.74.0.0/16, 2
201.76.16.0/20, 2
201.80.0.0/14, 70
References:
[1] https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en
[2] http://www.socks24.org/2017/09/28-09-17-vip-socks-5_18.html
[3] http://www.live-socks.net/2017/09/28-09-17-socks-5-servers-5470.html
[4] http://www.vipsocks24.net/2017/09/28-09-17-vip-socks-5-servers-5320.html
[5] https://lacnic.net/cgi-bin/lacnic/whois
Comments
Anonymous
Dec 3rd 2022
9 months ago
Anonymous
Dec 3rd 2022
9 months ago
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Anonymous
Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
Anonymous
Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
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Anonymous
Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
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Anonymous
Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
Anonymous
Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
https://defineprogramming.com/
Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
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https://clickercounter.org/
https://defineprogramming.com/
Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
rthrth
Jan 2nd 2023
8 months ago