Last Updated: 2011-11-08 22:18:48 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 2)
Overview of the November 2011 Microsoft patches and their status.
|Contra Indications - KB
|An integer overflow in the TCP/IP stack allows random code execution from a stream of UDP packets sent to a closed port. Permission for the attacker are at kernel level.
|No publicly known exploits.
|An input validation vulnerability in the parsing of true type fonts allows a denial of service from users with valid credentials.
|Kernel mode drivers
No publicly known exploits.
|Inappropriate path restriction allows Windows Mail and Windows Meeting Space to be exploited into executing random code with the rights of the logged on user.
Yet another vulnerability related to SA 2269637.
|Windows Mail & Windows Meeting Space
No publicly known exploits
|If Active Directory is configured to use LDAP over SSL, an attacker having a revoked certificate that is associated with a valid domain account, could get authenticated.
|No publicly known exploits
|Rereleased for XP and Server 2003. To quote Microsoft's FAQ: "The new offering of this update provides systems running Windows XP or Windows Server 2003 with the same cumulative protection that is provided by this update for all other affected operating systems."
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY
- We use 4 levels:
- PATCH NOW: Typically used where we see immediate danger of exploitation. Typical environments will want to deploy these patches ASAP. Workarounds are typically not accepted by users or are not possible. This rating is often used when typical deployments make it vulnerable and exploits are being used or easy to obtain or make.
- Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time to test.
- Important: Things where more testing and other measures can help.
- Less Urgent: Typically we expect the impact if left unpatched to be not that big a deal in the short term. Do not forget them however.
- The difference between the client and server rating is based on how you use the affected machine. We take into account the typical client and server deployment in the usage of the machine and the common measures people typically have in place already. Measures we presume are simple best practices for servers such as not using outlook, MSIE, word etc. to do traditional office or leisure work.
- The rating is not a risk analysis as such. It is a rating of importance of the vulnerability and the perceived or even predicted threat for affected systems. The rating does not account for the number of affected systems there are. It is for an affected system in a typical worst-case role.
- Only the organization itself is in a position to do a full risk analysis involving the presence (or lack of) affected systems, the actually implemented measures, the impact on their operation and the value of the assets involved.
- All patches released by a vendor are important enough to have a close look if you use the affected systems. There is little incentive for vendors to publicize patches that do not have some form of risk to them.
(**): The exploitability rating we show is the worst of them all due to the too large number of ratings Microsoft assigns to some of the patches.
Swa Frantzen -- Section 66