Emotet Returns

Emotet Returns
Introduction Back in January 2021, law enforcement and judicial authorities worldwide took down the Emotet botnet. Although some Emotet emails still went out in the weeks after that, those were remnants from the inactive botnet infrastructure. We hadn't seen any new Emotet since then. But on Monday 2021-11-15, we saw indicators that Emotet has returned. This diary reviews activity from a recent Emotet infection. Shown above: Chain of events for Emotet infection on Monday 2021-11-15. Emails We found some emails from a newly-revived Emotet botnet on Monday 2021-11-15 that have one of three types of attachments: Microsoft Excel spreadsheet Microsoft Word document Password-protected zip archive (password: BMIIVYHZ) containing a Word document These emails were all spoofed replies that used data from stolen email chains, presumably gathered from previously infected Windows hosts. Shown above: Example of Emotet malspam with password protected zip attachment. Shown above: Example of Emotet malspam with attached Word document. Shown above: Example of Emotet malspam with attached Excel file. Shown above: Screenshot of Word document for Emotet. Shown above: Screenshot of Excel spreadsheet for Emotet. Infection traffic Infection traffic for Emotet is similar to what we saw before the takedown in January 2021. The only real difference is Emotet post-infection C2 is now encrypted HTTPS instead of unencrypted HTTP. My infected lab host turned into a spambot trying to push out more Emotet malspam. Shown above: Example of traffic generated by Excel or Word macros for an Emotet DLL. Shown above: Traffic from an infection filtered in Wireshark. Shown above: TCP stream of encrypted SMTP traffic from my infected Windows host. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) The following are Word documents, Excel files, and a password-protected zip archive I saw from Emotet on Monday 2021-11-15. SHA256 hash: 7c5690577a49105db766faa999354e0e4128e902dd4b5337741e00e1305ced24 File size: 143,401 bytes File name: DOC_100045693068737895.docm File name: DOC_10010148844855817699830.docm File name: INF_10043023764772507433030.docm SHA256 hash: bd9b8fe173935ad51f14abc16ed6a5bf6ee92ec4f45fd2ae1154dd2f727fb245 File size: 143,121 bytes File name: FILE_24561806179285605525.docm SHA256 hash: f7a4da96129e9c9708a005ee28e4a46af092275af36e3afd63ff201633c70285 File size: 132,317 bytes File name: INF_4069641746481110.zip SHA256 hash: d95125b9b82df0734b6bc27c426d42dea895c642f2f6516132c80f896be6cf32 File size: 143,108 bytes File name: INF_4069641746481110.docm SHA256 hash: 88b225f9e803e2509cc2b83c57ccd6ca8b6660448a75b125e02f0ac32f6aadb9 File size: 47,664 bytes File name: FILE_10065732097649344691490.xlsm SHA256 hash: 1abd14d498605654e20feb59b5927aa835e5c021cada80e8614e9438ac323601 File size: 47,660 bytes File name: SCAN_1002996108727260055496.xlsm The following are URLs generated by macros from the above files for an Emotet DLL file: hxxp://av-quiz[.]tk/wp-content/k6K/ hxxp://devanture[.]com[.]sg/wp-includes/XBByNUNWvIEvawb68/ hxxp://ranvipclub[.]net/pvhko/a/ hxxp://visteme[.]mx/shop/wp-admin/PP/ hxxps://goodtech.cetxlabs[.]com/content/5MfZPgP06/ hxxps://newsmag.danielolayinkas[.]com/content/nVgyRFrTE68Yd9s6/ hxxps://team.stagingapps[.]xyz/wp-content/aPIm2GsjA/ The Emotet DLL was first stored as a random file name with a .dll extension under the C:\ProgramData directory. Then it was moved to a randomly-named directory under the infected user's AppData\Local folder. The DLL is then made persistent through a Windows registry update as shown below. Shown above: Example of registry update to keep Emotet persistent. SHA256 hashes for 7 examples of Emotet DLL files: 0b132c7214b87082ed1fc2427ba078c3b97cbbf217ca258e21638cab28824bfa 373398e4ae50ecb20840e6f8a458501437cfa8f7b75ad8a62a84d5c0d14d3e59 29de2e527f736d4be12b272fd8b246c96290c7379b6bc2d62c7c86ebf7f33cd4 632447a94c590b3733e2e6ed135a516428b0bd1e57a7d254d5357b52668b41f1 69efec4196d8a903de785ed404300b0bf9fce67b87746c0f3fc44a2bb9a638fc 9c345ee65032ec38e1a29bf6b645cde468e3ded2e87b0c9c4a93c517d465e70d b95a6218777e110578fa017ac14b33bf968ca9c57af7e99bd5843b78813f46e0 HTTPS Emotet C2 traffic: 51.75.33[.]120 port 443 51.159.35[.]157 port 443 81.0.236[.]93 port 443 94.177.248[.]64 port 443 92.207.181[.]106 port 8080 109.75.64[.]100 port 8080 163.172.50[.]82 port 443 Final words The emails examples and malware samples from Monday's Emotet activity on 2021-11-15 can be found here. --- Brad Duncan brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net	Brad 417 Posts ISC Handler Nov 16th 2021
Reply Subscribe	Nov 16th 2021 2 weeks ago
Thanks for posting these details. I took the opportunity to educate the people in my organization and encourage them to notify us if they receive email that looks suspicious before opening the attachments. I also "borrowed" or "stole" your diagram describing the flow of the infection. For the visual learners out there this is helpful for them to understand that opening the attachment is all it takes to be infected. And I always remind them, "We would rather spend a few minutes investigating a message you feel uneasy about rather than open an attachment and spend hours or days rebuilding a system or systems." Thanks and keep up the good work.	Anonymous
Reply Quote	Nov 16th 2021 2 weeks ago
Thanks for the detailed analysis and heads-up! Emotet will abuse established trust between people as well as the "known good" / "accepted domains" configurations that have been implemented to improve communications with customers, partners etc. A strong defense is to simply block macro-enabled Office documents via anti-malware policies, do not forget that this even works for docm/xlsm/pptm files inside password protected ZIP files as the file names are not encrypted. Blocking of macro-enabled documents should not affect users at all because they will be notified that this has been blocked and can find ways around this for legitimate use. Did you mean to send a PDF version, could you share via our collaboration tool etc. docs.microsoft[.]com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/configure-anti-malware-policies?view=o365-worldwide#use-the-microsoft-365-defender-portal-to-create-anti-malware-policies Enable the common attachments filter: If you select this option, messages with the specified attachments are treated as malware and are automatically quarantined. You can modify the default list by selecting Customize file types. THANKS from a long time reader. Tor PS: Yes, old macros come in .XLSX or .XLS files.. But, finally, Microsoft has published techcommunity.microsoft[.]com/t5/excel-blog/restrict-usage-of-excel-4-0-xlm-macros-with-new-macro-settings/ba-p/2528450 and promise that "XLM macros will soon be disabled by default" Users can expect this coming change in default behavior to occur in the following M365 updates: 2021 October Current Channel 2021 December Monthly Enterprise Channel 2022 January Semi-Annual Enterprise Channel (Preview) 2022 July Semi-Annual Enterprise Channel	dotBATman 68 Posts
Reply Quote	Nov 17th 2021 2 weeks ago

Introduction

Back in January 2021, law enforcement and judicial authorities worldwide took down the Emotet botnet. Although some Emotet emails still went out in the weeks after that, those were remnants from the inactive botnet infrastructure. We hadn't seen any new Emotet since then.

But on Monday 2021-11-15, we saw indicators that Emotet has returned. This diary reviews activity from a recent Emotet infection.

Shown above: Chain of events for Emotet infection on Monday 2021-11-15.

Emails

We found some emails from a newly-revived Emotet botnet on Monday 2021-11-15 that have one of three types of attachments:

Microsoft Excel spreadsheet
Microsoft Word document
Password-protected zip archive (password: BMIIVYHZ) containing a Word document

These emails were all spoofed replies that used data from stolen email chains, presumably gathered from previously infected Windows hosts.

Shown above: Example of Emotet malspam with password protected zip attachment.

Shown above: Example of Emotet malspam with attached Word document.

Shown above: Example of Emotet malspam with attached Excel file.

Shown above: Screenshot of Word document for Emotet.

Shown above: Screenshot of Excel spreadsheet for Emotet.

Infection traffic

Infection traffic for Emotet is similar to what we saw before the takedown in January 2021. The only real difference is Emotet post-infection C2 is now encrypted HTTPS instead of unencrypted HTTP. My infected lab host turned into a spambot trying to push out more Emotet malspam.

Shown above: Example of traffic generated by Excel or Word macros for an Emotet DLL.

Shown above: Traffic from an infection filtered in Wireshark.

Shown above: TCP stream of encrypted SMTP traffic from my infected Windows host.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The following are Word documents, Excel files, and a password-protected zip archive I saw from Emotet on Monday 2021-11-15.

SHA256 hash: 7c5690577a49105db766faa999354e0e4128e902dd4b5337741e00e1305ced24

File size: 143,401 bytes
File name: DOC_100045693068737895.docm
File name: DOC_10010148844855817699830.docm
File name: INF_10043023764772507433030.docm

SHA256 hash: bd9b8fe173935ad51f14abc16ed6a5bf6ee92ec4f45fd2ae1154dd2f727fb245

File size: 143,121 bytes
File name: FILE_24561806179285605525.docm

SHA256 hash: f7a4da96129e9c9708a005ee28e4a46af092275af36e3afd63ff201633c70285

File size: 132,317 bytes
File name: INF_4069641746481110.zip

SHA256 hash: d95125b9b82df0734b6bc27c426d42dea895c642f2f6516132c80f896be6cf32

File size: 143,108 bytes
File name: INF_4069641746481110.docm

SHA256 hash: 88b225f9e803e2509cc2b83c57ccd6ca8b6660448a75b125e02f0ac32f6aadb9

File size: 47,664 bytes
File name: FILE_10065732097649344691490.xlsm

SHA256 hash: 1abd14d498605654e20feb59b5927aa835e5c021cada80e8614e9438ac323601

File size: 47,660 bytes
File name: SCAN_1002996108727260055496.xlsm

The following are URLs generated by macros from the above files for an Emotet DLL file:

hxxp://av-quiz[.]tk/wp-content/k6K/
hxxp://devanture[.]com[.]sg/wp-includes/XBByNUNWvIEvawb68/
hxxp://ranvipclub[.]net/pvhko/a/
hxxp://visteme[.]mx/shop/wp-admin/PP/
hxxps://goodtech.cetxlabs[.]com/content/5MfZPgP06/
hxxps://newsmag.danielolayinkas[.]com/content/nVgyRFrTE68Yd9s6/
hxxps://team.stagingapps[.]xyz/wp-content/aPIm2GsjA/

The Emotet DLL was first stored as a random file name with a .dll extension under the C:\ProgramData directory. Then it was moved to a randomly-named directory under the infected user's AppData\Local folder. The DLL is then made persistent through a Windows registry update as shown below.

Shown above: Example of registry update to keep Emotet persistent.

SHA256 hashes for 7 examples of Emotet DLL files:

0b132c7214b87082ed1fc2427ba078c3b97cbbf217ca258e21638cab28824bfa
373398e4ae50ecb20840e6f8a458501437cfa8f7b75ad8a62a84d5c0d14d3e59
29de2e527f736d4be12b272fd8b246c96290c7379b6bc2d62c7c86ebf7f33cd4
632447a94c590b3733e2e6ed135a516428b0bd1e57a7d254d5357b52668b41f1
69efec4196d8a903de785ed404300b0bf9fce67b87746c0f3fc44a2bb9a638fc
9c345ee65032ec38e1a29bf6b645cde468e3ded2e87b0c9c4a93c517d465e70d
b95a6218777e110578fa017ac14b33bf968ca9c57af7e99bd5843b78813f46e0

HTTPS Emotet C2 traffic:

51.75.33[.]120 port 443
51.159.35[.]157 port 443
81.0.236[.]93 port 443
94.177.248[.]64 port 443
92.207.181[.]106 port 8080
109.75.64[.]100 port 8080
163.172.50[.]82 port 443

Final words

The emails examples and malware samples from Monday's Emotet activity on 2021-11-15 can be found here.

---

Brad Duncan
brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net

Brad

417 Posts
ISC Handler

Nov 16th 2021

Thanks for posting these details. I took the opportunity to educate the people in my organization and encourage them to notify us if they receive email that looks suspicious before opening the attachments. I also "borrowed" or "stole" your diagram describing the flow of the infection. For the visual learners out there this is helpful for them to understand that opening the attachment is all it takes to be infected.

And I always remind them, "We would rather spend a few minutes investigating a message you feel uneasy about rather than open an attachment and spend hours or days rebuilding a system or systems."

Thanks and keep up the good work.

Anonymous

Thanks for the detailed analysis and heads-up!

Emotet will abuse established trust between people as well as the "known good" / "accepted domains" configurations that have been implemented to improve communications with customers, partners etc.

A strong defense is to simply block macro-enabled Office documents via anti-malware policies, do not forget that this even works for docm/xlsm/pptm files inside password protected ZIP files as the file names are not encrypted.

Blocking of macro-enabled documents should not affect users at all because they will be notified that this has been blocked and can find ways around this for legitimate use. Did you mean to send a PDF version, could you share via our collaboration tool etc.

docs.microsoft[.]com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/configure-anti-malware-policies?view=o365-worldwide#use-the-microsoft-365-defender-portal-to-create-anti-malware-policies
Enable the common attachments filter: If you select this option, messages with the specified attachments are treated as malware and are automatically quarantined. You can modify the default list by selecting Customize file types.

THANKS from a long time reader.
Tor

PS: Yes, old macros come in .XLSX or .XLS files.. But, finally, Microsoft has published techcommunity.microsoft[.]com/t5/excel-blog/restrict-usage-of-excel-4-0-xlm-macros-with-new-macro-settings/ba-p/2528450 and promise that "XLM macros will soon be disabled by default"

Users can expect this coming change in default behavior to occur in the following M365 updates:

2021 October Current Channel
2021 December Monthly Enterprise Channel
2022 January Semi-Annual Enterprise Channel (Preview)
2022 July Semi-Annual Enterprise Channel

dotBATman

68 Posts