The WMF vulnerability uses images (WMF images) to execute arbitrary code. It will execute just by viewing the image. In most cases, you don't have click anything. Even images stored on your system may cause the exploit to be triggered if it is indexed by some indexing software. Viewing a directory in Explorer with 'Icon size' images will cause the exploit to be triggered as well.
Internet explorer will view the image without warning. New versions of Firefox will prompt you before opening the image. However, this will offer little protection given that these are images frequently considered as 'safe'.
All. Windows 2000, Windows XP, (SP1 and SP2), Windows 2003. All are affected to some extend. Mac OS-X, Unix or BSD is not affected.
Microsoft has not yet released a patch. An unofficial patch was made available by Ilfak Guilfanov. Our own Tom Liston reviewed the patch and we tested it. The reviewed and tested version is available here (MD5: 99b27206824d9f128af6aa1cc2ad05bc). THANKS to Ilfak Guilfanov for providing the patch!!
You can unregister the related DLL (shimgvw.dll).
Virus checkers provide some protection.
Our current "best practice" recommendation is to both unregister the DLL and to use the unofficial patch.
It might help. But it is not foolproof. We want to be very clear on this: we have some very stong indications that simply unregistering the shimgvw.dll isn't always successful. The .dll can be re-registered by other processes, and there may be issues where re-registering the .dll on a running system that has had an exploit to succeed. In addition it seems there might be issues in the gdi32.dll which cannot be unregistered all that easy.
Not a bad idea. But Windows File Protection may replace it. You have to turn off Windows File Protection first. Also, once an official patch is available you will need to replace the DLL. (renaming it is probably better so you have it handy).
This may help, but it is not sufficient. WMF files are recognized by a special header and the extension is not needed. The files could arrive using any extension, or embeded in Word or other documents.
With Windows XP SP2, Microsoft introduced DEP. It protects against a wide range of exploits, by preventing the execution of 'data segements'. However, to work well, it requires hardware support. Some CPUs, like AMD's 64 Bit CPUs, will provide full DEP protection and will prevent the exploit.
At this point, we are aware of versions of the exploit that will not be detected by antivirus engines. We hope they will catch up soon. But it will be a hard battle to catch all versions of the exploit. Up to date AV systems are necessary but likely not sufficient.
There are too many methods to mention them all. E-mail attachments, web sites, instant messaging are probably the most likely sources. Don't forget P2P file sharing and other sources.
No. It helps, but its likely not sufficient. We had at least one widely trusted web site (knoppix-std.org) which was compromissed. As part of the compromisse, a frame was added to the site redirecting users to a corrupt WMF file. "Tursted" sites have been used like this in the past.
WMF images are a bit different then most other images. Instead of just containing simple 'this pixel has that color' information, WMF images can call external procedures. One of these procedure calls can be used to execute the code.
By all means yes. Also, do not run as an administrator level users for every day work. However, this will only limit the impact of the exploit, and not prevent it. Also: Web browsing is only one way to trigger the exploit. If the image is left behind on your system, and later viewed by an administrator, you may get 'hit'.
maybe... do you allow the uploading of images? email? Are these images indexed? Do you sometimes use a web browser on the server? In short: If someone can get a image to your server, and if the vulnerable DLL may look at it, your server may very well be vulnerable.
Not much. A proxy server that strips all images from web sites? Probably wont go over well with your users. At least block .WMF images (see above about extensions...). If your proxy has some kind of virus checker, it may catch it. Same for mail servers. The less you allow your users to initiate outbound connections, the better. Close monitoring of user workstations may provide a hint if a work station is infected.
Most IDS vendors are working on signatures. Contact your vendor for details. Bleedingsnort.org is providing some continuosly improving signatures for snort users.
Not much :-(. It very much depends on the exact exploit you are hit with. Most of them will download additional components. It can be very hard, or even impossible, to find all the pieces. Microsoft offers free support for issues like that at 866-727-2389 (866 PC SAFETY).
But there is no patch at the time of this writing.
I will be teaching next: Intrusion Detection In-Depth - SANS Las Vegas Spring 2020
Jan 1st 2006
1 decade ago